Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within
the Regulatory Control of the Securities
Act of 1933?
Shanah D. Glickt
In the past five years, a new market has arisen that affords
terminally-ill persons, frequently AIDS patients in the last eighteen to twenty-four months of life, access to needed financial resources. These transactions, known as viatical settlements, function in the following manner. Upon certification of the patient's
medical condition, she assigns ownership of her life insurance policy to the buyer. The buyer then names herself as the new beneficiary of the policy. As payment for the right to future life insurance proceeds, the buyer advances to the seller fifty to eighty
percent of the face value of the policy. The buyer usually pays the
designated purchase price immediately in one lump-sum amount,
although occasionally the seller requests a short-term payment
stream.1
The companies active in this new market fall into one of two
categories. First are those companies, capitalized through either
private funds or the sale of company stock, that purchase the life
insurance policies directly from patients. These companies are the
ultimate buyers of the policies; they hold all rights to the policies
through either complete ownership or assignment, and they are the
new named beneficiaries of the policies.' Because these companies
purchase policies directly, these transactions will be referred to as
non-brokered viatical settlements. Second, some companies act as
brokers or middlemen by matching a potential buyer or group of
buyers with a particular policy currently "on the market." The
buyer purchases the rights under the policy, naming herself the
new beneficiary. The broker never assumes ownership and instead
receives payment in return for services rendered.3 These transact
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tions will be referred to as brokered viatical settlements. To date,
at least one state securities commissioner has decided to treat
brokered viatical settlements as securities.4 This Comment considers whether either type of settlement is a security under the Securities Act of 1933 ("the '33 Act").
Section I of this Comment examines the application of the '33
Act to viatical settlements, discussing both the Act's definition of a
security and its exemption for contracts of insurance. Section H
argues that viatical settlements are not insurance because, while
they involve the sale of an insurance policy, the transaction nevertheless lacks the characteristics that define an insurance or general
indemnification contract. Section III argues that viatical settlements are not securities either under the "investment contract"
language of the '33 Act,' as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
SEC v Howey Co.,7 or under a functional analysis of the transac-

tions. Critically, the finding that viatical settlements do not comport with our basic functional understanding of a security helps to
explain the tensions that become apparent in the application of
Howey. This Comment concludes that, whether brokered or nonbrokered, viatical settlements are not securities and therefore are
not subject to the regulatory control of the '33 Act.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITIES

ACT

OF

1933

It is commonly and correctly stated that the '33 Act is not a
comprehensive, federal, anti-fraud regulation of all financial transactions.8 The '33 Act was instead "intended to encourage 'honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence' in
the investment markets." 9 The '33 Act regulates the public offering of securities in an attempt to protect investors from fraud. 10

In August 1992, Glenn Pomeroy, the Securities Commissioner of North Dakota, issued
cease-and-desist orders against two viatical settlement brokers on the grounds that the companies were engaged in the unregistered sale of securities. Peter Kerr, Now, AIDS Patients'

Lives Are DrawingSpeculators, NY Times Al (Aug 20, 1992); States ProbeLife Insurance
Schemes, Chi Trib at C3 (cited in note 2). .
5 Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC §§ 77b(1), 77c(a)(8) (1988). These sections will be
referred to as §§ 2(1) and 3(a)(8) respectively for the remainder of this Comment.
$ 15 USC § 77b(1).
328 US 293, 298-99 (1946).
6 See, for example, Reves v Ernst & Young, 494 US 56, 61 (1990), citing Marine Bank v
Weaver, 455 US 551, 556 (1982).
0 Gary PlasticPackaging Corp. v MerrillLynch, Pierce,Penner & Smith, Inc., 756 F2d
230, 237 (2d Cir 1985), quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress
(March 29, 1933), in 77 Cong Rec 937 (1933) (emphasis added).
10 See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 195 (1976).
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Transactions involving investments other than securities, and even
some particular types of securities, are excluded from the '33 Act's
coverage.1
The '33 Act's regulatory structure is relatively straightforward.
If an investment fulfills the '33 Act's definition of a security and
has not been specifically exempted from compliance with the Act's
provisions, the issuer of that security must comply with specific
disclosure requirements before proceeding with the public offering." This regulatory regime poses two questions: Is the instrument a security? Is the instrument expressly exempt from the regulatory control of the '33 Act?
Among the instruments expressly excluded from the '33 Act's
definition of "security" are insurance policies. Section 3(a)(8) of
the Act provides:
the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the
following classes of securities: Any insurance or endowment
policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued
by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer
performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia. s
Actually, the language of § 3(a)(8) is misleading. The '33 Act
implies that insurance contracts are securities and that, were it not
for the exemption, they would be subject to the '33 Act's provisions. This is not true. As this Comment will establish, insurance
contracts are not securities. They are wholly outside of the '33 Act.
Justice Brennan wrote in his concurring opinion in SEC v Variable
Annuity Co.: "[I]t would appear that in the case of the ordinary
insurance policy, the exemption would be just confirmatory of the
policy's noncoverage under the definition of security.

' 14

The ex-

" See, for example, the exemption of securities issued or guaranteed by the United
States government in § 3(a)(2), the exemption for securities which are part of an intrastate
offering in § 3(a)(11), and the exemption of notes with a maturity of less than 9 months in
§ 3(a)(3). 15 USC § 77c(a) (1988).
Is James Cox, Robert Hillman, and Donald Langevoort, Securities Regulation 215 (Little, Brown & Co., 1991).
Is 15 USC § 77c(a)(8). This section exempts both life insurance policies and annuities.
For a discussion of the relevance of the annuity exemption to viatical settlements, see text
accompanying notes 27-29.
14359 US 65, 74 n 4 (1959) (Brennan concurring), citing HR Rep No 85, 73d Cong, 1st
Sess 15 (1933).
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emption is "clearly supererogation"; 15 it is superfluous because
even without the exemption insurance is not a security. Nonetheless, the '33 Act expressly excludes insurance from its definition of

a security.
This Comment will first consider whether viatical settlements
are contracts of insurance, and thus exempt from the '33 Act under
§ 3(a)(8). If viatical settlements are contracts of insurance, it is
irrelevant whether they are securities. The securities law would not
apply due to the exemption for contracts of insurance. If, on the
other hand, viatical settlements are not contracts of insurance, that
conclusion does not resolve whether or not the settlements are securities. Because this Comment concludes that viatical settlements
are not insurance contracts, it proceeds to consider whether they
are securities.
II.

ARE VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS "CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE"?

Although viatical settlements are relatively new transactions,
the assignment of life insurance policies has long been permitted.,,
Nevertheless, courts have not addressed the issue of whether an
assignment of a life insurance policy is a security under the '33
Act. This Section, therefore, analyzes an open question in considering whether viatical settlements, a special class of life insurance
assignments, are securities. Subsection A describes two fundamental characteristics of insurance policies. Subsection B shows how
the Supreme Court has used a functional analysis that focuses on
these characteristics to determine whether annutities fall with the
'33 Act's insurance exemption. Subsection C extends that func15 Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 US 332, 342 n 30 (1967); see also Grainger v State Sec.

Life Ins. Co., 547 F2d 303, 305 n 6 (5th Cir 1977).
1" "[A]lthough an insurable interest is necessary where a would-be-beneficiary applies
to insure someone else's life, public policy does not prohibit a good faith assignment or
transfer of a life insurance policy previously issued to one without an insurable interest." In
re Butcher, 72 BR 240, 244 (E D Tenn 1987), citing Clement v New York Life Insurance
Co., 101 Tenn 22, 36, 46 SW 561, 564 (1898). The rationale behind this policy is that a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy does not need an insurable interest at the time of death
in order to receive the proceeds of a policy. In re Al Zuni Trading,Inc., 947 F2d 1403, 1405
(9th Cir 1991) ("[The almost universal rule of law in this country is that if the insurable
interest requirement is satisfied at the time the policy is issued, the proceeds of the policy
must be paid upon the death of the life insured without regard to whether the beneficiary
has an insurable interest at the time of death."), quoting Secor v Pioneer Foundry Co., 20
Mich App 30, 34-35, 173 NW2d 780, 782 (1970). The majority of courts and legal scholars
decided there was no logic to requiring insurable interests for assignees but not beneficiaries
and abandoned assignment restrictions as meaningless formalities. Robert Keeton and Alan
Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles,Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices § 3.5(d) at 186 (West, 1988). This Comment adopts the majority view.
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tional analysis to viatical settlements and concludes that they do
not fall within the insurance exception.
A. Insurance Characteristics: Risk-Transfer and Risk-Spreading
Although there is much disagreement concerning the definition of a security, an instrument's classification as a standard insurance policy does not give rise to similar problems. A true contract of insurance both transfers risk and distributes (or spreads)
risk.1 7 In the case of the most straightforward life insurance policy
(a policyholder insuring her own life), the insured knows that at an
unspecified date in the future she will die and the risk of financial
loss occasioned by her death (loss of income or services) will be
realized. The insured transfers this risk, or at least a portion of the
risk, to the insurer, who assumes the risk by agreeing to compensate the insured's estate or a designee for a pre-determined sum
that is theoretically no more than the aggregate financial loss resulting from the insured's death.' The life insurance policy is the
contractual obligation that transfers this risk. By the terms of the
contract, the insured pays the third party actuarially-derived premiums to assume this risk. Thus, the premiums are the price of the
risk-transferral.
From the insured's point of view, the success of the risk-transferral depends upon the payment of premiums and the solvency of
the insurer. Unlike an investment, the rate of return on an insurance policy does not depend upon how the insurer employs the
money paid (the premiums). The insurer has categorically and unqualifiedly agreed to compensate the insured upon the realization
of a contractually-defined risk.
The concept of risk-distribution or risk-spreading enables insurance companies to assume their clients' risks through a pooling
technique. Again, concerning ourselves with only standard life in-

17

Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 1.2 at 6; Kenneth Abraham, InsuranceLaw and

Regulation 2 (Foundation Press, 1990). Professor Abraham identifies a third characteristic
of insurance, risk-allocation, which focuses on the insurance company's risk pricing mechanism-the relationship of risk levels to premiums charged. Id. Because this factor bears on

the internal mechanics of insurance companies, it may be ignored for purposes of this
Comment.
19 Even in insuring one's own life, one is bound by the formal logic that, because insurance is strictly compensatory, one cannot insure one's life for more than the loss which will
be occasioned by death. In order to avoid the difficulty, if not moral distaste, of economically evaluating a person's life, we generally employ the legal fiction that this interest is
unlimited because human life is of infinite value. Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law
§ 3.5(b)(1) at 178-79.
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surance policies, the insurance company knows that each individual risk will be realized at some uncertain date in the future. The
company sets prices based on statistical models, which will underestimate the actual costs in some cases and will overestimate the
actual costs in others. By the law of averages, if an insurance company extends coverage to enough people, the risks should net out,
and the insurance company will not face overexposure. Pooling
thus minimizes insurance companies' net exposure to risk.
Not only do securities lack the elements of risk-transferral and
risk-spreading, but life insurance also lacks the central and perhaps the one undisputed characteristic of a security: the pursuit of
profit. 19 From the policyholder's point of view, insurance is not a
profit-driven transaction. The doctrine of insurable interest establishes that insurance cannot be undertaken for wagering (profitseeking) purposes. 20 A person cannot insure property in which she
does not have an identifiable interest.2 1 A merchant can insure her
delivery truck, but she cannot insure her competitor's delivery
truck. If her truck is destroyed, she will lose both the truck and
any business dependent on the truck. Insurance proceeds would
compensate her for a realized risk. But if her competitor's truck is
destroyed, she suffers no loss, because she had an interest in
neither the truck itself nor in its routes. Any money realized on the
destruction of the competitor's truck would be profit-the successful realization of a gambling proposition.2 2

19

The pursuit of profit is a fundamental characteristic of a security. The Court has

established that a scheme is an "investment contract," and therefore a security, if it "involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
effort of others." Howey, 328 US at 301 (emphasis added).
20 See, for example, Warnock & Davis, 104 US 775, 779 (1881) (life insurance policies

not based on an insurable interest are wagers, and therefore against public policy); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v Davidson,715 F Supp 775, 777 (S D Miss 1989) (same); New York
Life Insurance Co. v Baum, 700 F2d 928, 934 (5th Cir 1983) (same); Prince v Royal Indemnity Co., 541 F2d 646, 649 (7th Cir 1976) (same), quoting Womble v Dubuque Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., 310 Mass 142, 147, 37 NE2d 263 (1941). This point regarding the

initial procurement of insurance, however, should not be understood to "preclude the [later]
assignments of life insurance contracts." Keeton & Widiss, InsuranceLaw § 3.5(b)(2) at 180
(cited in note 16). See text accompanying note 23.
21 See, for example, Omaha Property and Casualty Co. v Crosby, 756 F Supp 1380,
1384 (D Mont 1990); In re Triangle Door and Truss Co., 41 BR 164, 169 (E D Tenn 1984);
Davidson, 715 F Supp at 776.
22 The insurable interest doctrine attempts not only to prohibit profit-seeking through
insurance, but also to prevent the intentional destruction of property for the purpose of
collecting insurance proceeds. Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.1(c) at 138. If a person has no interest in or connection to property or a life, and that person insures the property or life against a risk, then that person has an incentive to cause the realization of the
risk. Normally, if a person has an insurable interest in the insured property or life, not only
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Likewise, a person can only insure another person's life if she
stands to suffer loss from that person's death.23 Outside the family
context, a person can assume insurance on the life of another if,
through a "pecuniary" relationship, she expects to receive "some
benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. ' 24 This pecuniary relationship exists when, for example, the
assured is a debtor, a business partner, or a key employee of the
insurer. 25 Even within the context of family relations, the purchaser has a sufficient insurable interest only if, because of "blood
or affinity," she benefits from the continued life of the assured.2 6
B.

The Supreme Court's Functional Analysis

In determining whether particular annuities are excluded from
the definition of "security" under § 3(a)(8) of the '33 Act, the Supreme Court employed a functional analysis that can be extended
to viatical settlements. SEC v Variable Annuity CoY and SEC v
United Benefit Insurance Co.28 presented the question of whether
non-traditional annuities, which attempt to hedge inflation risks
by tying the annuity payment to the value of the market pool in
which the funds were invested, were securities under the '33 Act.
In each case, the Court focused on the functional characteristics of
the annuity as a form of insurance. In Variable Annuity, the Court
stated that the annuity in question lacked "true underwriting of
risks, the one earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding and usage."2 Because the value
is the incentive not present, but that person is actively deterred from purposeful destruction
of the property or life. The person either has a financial self-interest in the everyday operating proceeds of the insured property or the person has a financial and/or emotional selfinterest in the continuation of the insured life. In the absence of an insurable interest,
neither these self-interests nor the deterrent effect they normally create are present. Thus,
by mandating the existence of an insurable interest, the doctrine attempts to prevent such
socially wasteful and typically criminal activity as the purposeful destruction of property or

life. Id.
23 Keeton and Widiss, InsuranceLaw § 3.5(a) at 179 (cited in note 16); see also Rubenstein v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 584 F Supp 272, 278 (E D La 1984).
"I Warnock, 104 US at 779.
15 Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.5(c)(3) at 183 (cited in note 16); see also Rubenstein, 584 F Supp at 274 n 1 (differentiating between credit life insurance in which the
"insurer risks that the debtor-insured will die before he can repay the creditor-beneficiary

an existing debt" and "key man" business insurance in which "the insurer risks the death of
someone whose loss would be highly detrimental to the business"); Baum, 700 F2d at 934
(creditor has insurable interest in life of the debtor).
26 Warnock, 104 US at 779.
" 359 US 65 (1959).
23 387 US 202 (1967).
21 359 US at 73 (footnote omitted).
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of the annuity hinged on the performance of the investment pool,
all risk was placed on the annuitant and none on the issuing company.3 0 Moreover, the mortality risk assumed by the issuing company was only an "apparent" and "superficial" "aspect of insurance."3 1 The annuity lacked the functional characteristic of risktransferral, and therefore, the Court held that the fund no longer
qualified for statutory exemption from the federal securities
32
regulation.
In United Benefit, the Court again adopted this functional
analysis, determining that a Flexible Fund contract was not an optional annuity contract within the '33 Act's § 3(a)(8) exemption.3
Responding to Variable Annuity, the Flexible Fund marketers offered an annuity with a market rate of return but which also contained a guaranteed payment portion which would place some investment risk on the issuing company in the hope of retaining
exempt annuity status. The Court, in turn, responded by deconstructing the Flexible Fund into two distinct promises: the payment of a guaranteed minimum annuity amount and the payment
of a variable amount, tied to the performance of the investment
pool. 4 The Court found that, although the guaranteed payment
did reduce "substantially the investment risk of the contract
holder, the assumption of an investment risk cannot by itself create an insurance provision under the federal definition."3 5 Under a
functional analysis, the Flexible Fund did not qualify for exemption under § 3(a)(8).3 6
C.

Application of Functional Analysis to Viatical Settlements

Based upon Variable Annuity and United Benefit, if viatical
settlements do not serve a risk-transferring or risk-spreading function, or do so to a superficial or insignificant degree, the settlements cannot be properly identified as exempt insurance contracts
under § 3(a)(8). This functional analysis therefore turns on the
mechanics of viatical settlements.
In a viatical settlement, the policyholder assigns all ownership
rights to a third party in return for a fixed sum of money. This

30 Id at 71.
31 Id.
32

Id.

387 US at 210-11.
Id at 209.
35 Id at 211, citing Helvering v Le Gierse, 312 US 531, 542 (1941).
86 United Benefit, 387 US at 211.
33
34
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sum reflects the buyer's estimation of the present value of the policy's future money claim, discounted by both the premiums the
buyer expects to pay and the risk that the seller will live longer
than expected. After purchasing the policy, the buyer steps into
the shoes of the former owner. The buyer assumes the right to
name the beneficiary of the policy, a power she will exercise in her
name to recoup the purchase price and to earn a return on the
investment.37 Most critically, because the buyer pays the purchase
price to the original owner, but receives later payment from the
insurance company, the return on the buyer's investment does not
depend on how the seller uses the proceeds from the sale.
In light of the mechanics of viatical settlements, the question
of whether the settlements sufficiently serve the functions required
to qualify for the insurance exemption seems to have a clear answer: no. First, the viatical settlement cannot qualify for statutory
exemption by virtue of the fact that its underlying asset, an insurance policy, is itself exempt. As noted in SEC v Joiner regarding
the definition of a security under the '33 Act, "the courts have not
been guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or offering. '3'8 The transaction must be analyzed on its merits, not on the nature of its underlying asset.
Second, the viatical settlement transaction itself does not
qualify as a form of insurance.3 9 The settlements neither transfer
nor distribute risk; they are therefore not contracts of insurance.

11 Just like buying stock for another person's benefit, the buyer could plausibly name
another person as the beneficiary. Such a designation would alter neither the investment
character of the transaction nor the profit expectation of the buyer.
320 US 344, 352 (1943) (assignment of oil leases was a security under the '33 Act). As
examples, the Court cited, among other cases, SEC v Crude Oil Corporationof America, 93
F2d 844, 848 (7th Cir 1937) (bills of sale for barrels of oil were securities) and SEC v Bailey,
41 F Supp 647, 651 (S D Fla 1941) (sale of land to be developed for the commercial cultivation of tung trees held to be a security). For more recent examples, see also Olson v E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., 957 F2d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir 1992) (brokers' unnecessary buying and
selling of certificates of deposit may bring CDs within federal securities law); Gary Plastic
Packing Corp. v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F2d 230, 240 (2d Cir
1985) (certificates of deposits sold by investment firm were securities).
3" Although § 3(a)(8) exempts both insurance and annuity contracts, this Comment
will focus only on the insurance exemption. Viatical settlements assign pre-existing exempt
life insurance policies, not pre-existing exempt annuities. Furthermore, in the typical annuity, the annuity issuer promises to pay the annuitant a specified annual sum, commencing
upon a certain date in the future. The annuitant pays to the annuity issuer either a lumpsum premium, annual premiums for a specified duration, or a combination of the two. When
the money is later "returned" through the annuity payments, one of the two parties bears
the cost of having incorrectly estimated the annuitant's life expectancy.
A viatical settlement is not an annuity because the selling policyholder does not assume
the risk that she will die sooner than expected. The policyholder/seller receives her money
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Variable Annuity teaches that, in determining whether an instrument fulfills the functional insurance requirement of risktransferral, both the buyer's and the seller's post-transaction positions must be examined. Effective risk-transferral demands particular actions and outcomes by both parties to an insurance or annuity transaction. The insured must have actively transferred a risk
and the insuring party must have actively assumed that same risk.
The Court in Variable Annuity found that the instruments in
question were not annuities because the annuitant (analogous to a
seller in a viatical settlement) had not effectively transferred any
risk to the insurance company (analogous to a buyer in a viatical
settlement). 0 Only by scrutinizing both parties to the transaction
was the Court able to conclude that "the variable annuity places
' 41
all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company."
Upon examining both the buyer's and the seller's post-transaction positions, it is clear that viatical settlements do not exhibit
any insurance functions or characteristics. The seller does not attempt to insure against the realization of a future risk; hence, there
is no risk-transferral. The seller attempts to gain either disposable
income to fulfill a last wish or needed financial resources for present expenses.4 2 In the first case, the seller is concerned not with
protecting against future risk but with present enjoyment through
consumption. In the second case, the seller has already realized a
risk, that of insolvency. Her actions are an ex post response, not an
ex ante measure of protection. Although the insured previously

up front and in a predetermined amount. Although the viatical settlement buyer will profit
from the policyholder's early'death, the policyholder, unlike the annuitant, does not incur a
financial loss by dying sooner than calculated, thus not recouping all of her invested funds.
Regardless of her date of death, she receives the same compensation. The characteristic risk
element of an annuity with regard to the annuitant has therefore been eliminated.
Similarly, the characteristic risk element of an annuity with regard to the issuer has
also been eliminated. The buyer in a viatical settlement does not assume the risk of extended payment that is the basis of an annuity. The fact that, just as in an annuity, the
buyer's profit will ultimately turn on the date of the insured's death is not sufficient to
transform a viatical settlement into an annuity. The insured's date of death marks the maturity of a financial investment, not the end of an 'annuity.
40 359 US at 71.
41 Id (footnote omitted).
412A recent informal survey conducted by the National Association of People with AIDS
(NAPWA) of 1800 people living with HIV or AIDS found that when "[a]sked to rank their
greatest needs, an overwhelming number cited financial assistance. Nearly three out of 10
respondents live on less than $500 a month, and another three in 10 live on between $500

and $1000 a month." Among those fully employed, 32% stated they lacked health care and

medicine, and 16.7% stated they needed access to adequate health care. NAPWA, Surprising Results From First-EverNational Needs Assessment: Violence, Discrimination,Poverty Common Problems, Living HIV 5 (Fall 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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transferred the risk of financial loss occasioned by death, she did
not transfer the risk of general insolvency, of financial loss through
major illness, or of any pre-death loss. In sum, the seller does not
seek to and is not involved in a risk-transferral activity. If anything, she is dissipating any risk-transferral she previously
undertook.
Similarly, the buyer does not act as an insurer. The buyer
neither assumes a risk from the seller nor spreads any risk. The
buyer does not accept a transferred risk because the seller does not
transfer a risk. The buyer does assume the investment risk that
the seller will not die soon enough for the buyer to realize a market-or at least a positive-rate of return on her money. The
seller, however, does not transfer this risk to the buyer. The risk is
created voluntarily by the buyer through her actions in purchasing
the policy. It is incidental that this investment risk flows from the
payout on a life insurance policy.
Second, the buyer neither spreads nor distributes risk-even
when she diversifies her viatical settlement portfolio by purchasing
numerous policies. Because the buyer assumes no risk from the
seller, she cannot spread or distribute such a risk. As for purchases
of numerous policies, the buyer is lessening her exposure to selfcreated investment risk, not spreading risk from the buyer. Only
the insurance company continues to spread the risk of loss occasioned by the seller's death.
Neither does the buyer create a short-term insurance policy on
the seller's life. Unlike the creditor who insures her debtor's life,
the buyer has no pre-transaction financial interest in the seller.
The interest arises only after and explicitly on account of the
transaction. Even if the alleged purpose of the transaction were to
insure the life of the seller, it would be invalid under the doctrine
of insurable interests. 3
Viatical settlements do not transfer or distribute risks even
though the asset underlying the transaction fulfills both functions.
Thus, as the American Council of Life Insurance has concluded,
viatical settlements are not instruments of insurance. 44 The following example should dispel any remaining belief that viatical settlements might be insurance contracts.

"I See text accompanying note 20.
44 Colleen Mulcahy, Viatical Settlement Dispute Flares, National Underwriter, Life
and Health/Financial Services Edition 3 (Sep 7, 1992), available on NEXIS (INSURE Library, NULIFE File).
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Suppose Seller owns a U.S. Treasury note.4 5 She is willing to
sell it, but she will not reveal any information regarding its maturity date, except for the fact that there is a high probability that the
Treasury note will mature within two years.4 6 Seller also informs
Buyer that an annual servicing fee must be paid to the third party
from whom she originally purchased the note. If Buyer wishes to
purchase, Buyer will discount the face value of the note in light of
her estimation of the maturity date, the annual servicing fees that
must be paid until that date, and the risk contained in the uncertainty about the maturity date. This discounted sum will be the
purchase price of the Treasury note.
This is the essence of a viatical settlement, yet a Treasury
note has been substituted for the life insurance policy. The transaction in both cases is driven by a third party's promise to pay a
fixed sum of money in the future. Whether the third party is the
United States government or a life insurance company is irrelevant. The investor looks only for certainty of repayment. The fundamental characteristics of the investment transaction cannot be
mistaken for those of the asset backing the investment.
Viatical settlements are not contracts of insurance; they
neither transfer nor distribute risk. As such, they are not eligible
for a § 3(a)(8) statutory exemption. Yet, they are not thus automatically rendered securities; they are only securities if they fall
within the definition of "security" in the '33 Act.
III.
A.

ARE VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS SECURITIES?

The Definition of a Security
Section 2(1) of the '33 Act defines a "security" as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security". .. .

In line with the remedial goals of the statute, the definition is
broad and comprehensive, although, as noted before, not all-inclu"5 A Treasury note is an obligation of the federal government that has a maturity of
one to five years.
4' Most viatical settlement companies "will not consider viatication if the insured has a
life expectancy of more than 2 years." Bandfield, Viatical Settlements at 9 (cited in note 1).
47 15 USC § 77b(1).
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sive. Recognizing the "countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits, ' 4 Congress specifically sought to capture in the § 2(1) definition unorthodox and innovative investments that nevertheless
are securities. The "investment contract" language of § 2(1) was
designed to fulfill this function, and it has largely succeeded in doing so.49 Given their novel and unorthodox nature, if viatical settlements are securities, it is because they fit within the "investment
contract" language of § 2(1). The assignment of a life insurance
policy does not fit any of the other § 2(1) enumerations of a
security.
B.

The Howey Test

The Supreme Court established the definition of an investment contract in SEC v Howey Co., 50 a case in which the Court
found that the offering and sale of orange groves in connection
with a service contract constituted a security under the investment
contract language of the '33 Act. To repeat oft-quoted language,
the Court stated that the "test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the effort of others.'
Howey has been distilled into a four-prong test. The test requires: 1) an investment of money, 2) that the investment be undertaken with the expectation of profit, 3) that the profits are derived solely from the effort of others, and 4) the existence of a
common enterprise. Although it is uniformly accepted that an instrument must satisfy all elements of the test to be a security, 52 the
requirements necessary to satisfy the third and fourth prongs have
been the subject of considerable controversy. Instead of choosing
among the competing interpretations of the Howey test, this Com-

48 SEC v Howey Co., 328 US 293, 299 (1946).

See, for example, Miller v Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F2d 414, 417 (8th Cir
1974) (chinchilla farming scheme found to involve the sale of a security); Smith v Gross, 604
F2d 639, 643 (9th Cir 1979) (earthworm breeding scheme found to involve sale of a security); SEC v Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F2d 577, 585 (2d Cir 1982) (franchise scheme
involving dental equipment was a security).
50 328 US 293 (1946).
51 Id at 301.
" See, for example, In re EPIC Mortgage InsuranceLitigation, 701 F Supp 1192, 1248
49

(E D Va 1988), citing Burton v Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 646 F Supp 360, 361 (E D Va
1986) (if any one of the four requirements of Howey is not met, the instrument is not a

security).
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ment will analyze viatical settlements under all existing
interpretations.
With respect to the first three requirements of the Howey test,
this Comment will analyze both brokered and non-brokered viatical settlements together. Application of the last Howey requirement (the common enterprise requirement), however, requires separate analysis of brokered and non-brokered transactions due to
the factual variations between the two transactions.
1. Brokered and non-brokered settlements under the first
three prongs of Howey.
First, Howey requires an "investment of money." An individual invests money if she commits assets in such a way that she is
subject to financial loss.5 3 In either a brokered or a non-brokered
viatical settlement, the investor, whether an individual or a company, commits cash assets by purchasing the life insurance policy.
The investor also subjects herself to the risk of financial loss. If the
seller lives longer than expected, the buyer might receive either a
below-market or a negative rate of return on her investment,
thereby realizing a financial loss. Thus, both brokered and nonbrokered viatical settlements satisfy the first prong of the Howey
test.
Second, Howey requires that the investor have an "expectation of profit." In United States Foundation,Inc. v Forman,5 the
Court held that shares of stock in a state-subsidized nonprofit
housing cooperative were not securities because the "investors were
attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and
not by financial returns on their investments. ' 55 Individuals could
not reside in the housing cooperative without purchasing a specified minimum number of shares, and only qualifying prospective
tenants could purchase the stock.5 6 The Court therefore found that
stock purchasers were motivated not by a profit-motive but by reasons of personal consumption and use. The purchasers had not
57
parted with their "money in the hope of receiving profits";
rather, they had parted with their money in the hope of receiving
housing accommodations. Whatever "profits" that may have been

53 Hector v Wiens, 533 F2d 429, 432 (9th Cir 1976), citing El Khadem v Equity Securities Corp., 494 F2d 1224 (9th Cir 1974).
- 421 US 837 (1975).
" Id at 853.
Id at 842-43.
57 Id at 858.
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generated through tax deductions, below-market rental fees, or income derived from leasing cooperative space to commercial entities, were "too speculative or insubstantial" to supplant the primary consumption motivation of the purchasers. 8 To be an
expectation, financial profits must be a substantial motivation of
the investor.
Buyers of brokered and non-brokered settlements invest with
the expectation of profit.5 9 Solicitation material for one brokered

settlement firm urged: "Enclosed is a real innovative MONEY
MAKER you really need to pursue. . .. The average investor return is better than 20% annually." 60 Moreover, it is highly improbable that an individual would lay out thousands of dollars of personal funds to an unrelated third party at substantial risk to
herself if she were not expecting financial gain. Furthermore, the
existence of a $100 million high-risk, high-return market suggests
that investors are motivated by the expectation of profit. Indeed,
industry participants acknowledge their own profit incentives. The
partner of one non-brokered viatical settlement company stated, "I
would say there's a lot of money involved [in viatical settlements].
It's a handsome return. There are no [other] good investments out
there." 1 Moreover, industry observers, such as the American
Council of Life Insurance, have noted that "there is a tendency for
[viatical settlement firms] to take large profits.""2
While viatical settlement companies might be partly motivated by desire to help terminally-ill patients meet their financial
obligations, this alone will not bring the settlements outside the
scope of Howey. It is not enough that investors have altruistic motives if they are also motivated by the expectation of profit. Under
Forman,it is only when the expectation of profit is too speculative
or insubstantial to be a motivating factor that this prong of Howey
is met. Viatical settlement companies have not sought the tax-free
charity status most appropriate for a purely humanitarian venture.
Nor do they target their investment returns to cover only costs and

68Forman,421 US at 856; see also Grenaderv Spitz, 537 F2d 612, 618 (2d Cir 1976)
(sale of stock in privately-owned housing cooperative was not a security because "the profit
motive, if any, was purely incidental").
59 The average viatical settlement investor expects at least a 15 percent return on the
investment. Telephone interview with Richard Bandfield, Financial Counselor, Bandfield &
Drivanos (Nov 4, 1992).
60 Letter from Joe Sowell, President, National Insurance Marketing, Inc. (July 10,
1992).
6' New Firms Cashing in on AIDS Patient'sInsurance, LA Bus J 1 (Aug 31, 1992).
62 Mulcahy, Viatical Settlement Dispute Flares at 3 (cited in note 44).
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a small profit; the fifteen percent return expected 3 is more consistent with a risk-capital venture than a humanitarian enterprise.
The third prong of Howey requires that profits derive "solely
from the efforts of others." In applying this prong, the courts have
not adhered to a literal interpretation of the word "solely." In SEC
v Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,Inc.,6 4 the Ninth Circuit held that
this prong of Howey is satisfied whenever "the efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably significant
ones." 6 5 The court feared that if it construed "solely" literally, any
investor participation in the activity would unreasonably deny the
investor the protection of the securities law. 6 As the court in SEC
v Koscot Interplanetary,Inc. declared, such "[a] literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the remedial purposes of
the Act."' 67 In Forman, the Supreme Court took notice of the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation, but declined to comment directly
on it.6 8 Nevertheless, the Court implicitly endorsed a more flexible
interpretation of "solely" when it stated that "the touchstone [of
the definition of a security] is the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others."6 9 By altering the traditional language of Howey, the Supreme Court identified that its concern was not that only others
advance efforts toward profit realization, but that others advance
significant efforts (managerial or entreprenuerial) from which profits will stem. In the wake of Forman, most lower courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead, applying the third prong of Howey
70
liberally.
Neither brokered nor non-brokered viatical settlements satisfy
either the liberal or the literal version of the "solely from the efforts of others" test. To satisfy this test, both the "other" whose
effort produces profits and the effort itself must be identified. Two
possible "others" exist: the policy seller and the viatical settlement
broker.
63Telephone interview with Richard Bandfield (cited in note 59).
474 F2d 476, 482 (9th Cir 1973).

Id. See also SEC v Murphy, 626 F2d 633, 641 (9th Cir 1980) (because the investors
had no managerial role whatsoever, the contract was a security under Howey); Hector, 533
F2d at 433 (critical inquiry is who controlled the firm's "essential managerial efforts").
6s Glenn Turner, 474 F2d at 482 (noting it would be easy to evade such a strict
interpretation).
67 497 F2d 473, 480 (5th Cir 1974).
65

421 US at 852 n 16.
69
70

Id at 852 (emphasis added).
Cox, Hillman, and Langevoort, Securities Regulation at 137 (cited in note 12).
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The policy seller's efforts do not satisfy the profits "solely
from the efforts of others" requirement. Putting aside concerns of
insurance company solvency, the investor's profits depend on two
factors: the initial sale of the assignment and the ultimate date of
death of the seller. The seller's efforts regarding the sale can be
subdivided into promotional efforts and price setting. The seller's
promotional efforts are insufficient to qualify as third-prong
Howey efforts, and her price-setting efforts actually counteract the
buyer's potential for profit realization.
The seller promotes a viatical settlement by initiating contact
with a buyer or broker and actively pursuing the transaction.
These efforts, however, do not satisfy the requirements of either
the liberal or the literal interpretations of Howey. Howey looks for
"entrepreneurial or managerial" efforts which produce profits after
the investor has committed her funds.7 1 All promoters must put
some efforts into packaging and marketing an investment plan.
Howey's inquiry, though, applies after the sale is completed and
asks whose efforts generate the expected profits-the promoter's
efforts or the investor's efforts.
In McCown v Heidler,2 in which purchasers of undeveloped
lots in a real estate development project filed securities claims,
plaintiffs alleged that interests sold in real property were investment contracts. The court rejected this claim, concluding that the
promoter's efforts in pricing the land and marketing it to potential
investors were irrelevant. Only the promoter's promise of future
efforts in the form of "substantial post-sale improvements" upon
the land transformed the sale of an asset into an investment which
could conceivably fall within the realm of the securities laws. 3 In
both brokered and non-brokered viatical settlements, expected
profits are not the product of the seller's active efforts. With the
completion of the assignment, the seller's participation is finished.
As she does not contribute any post-sale entrepreneurial or managerial efforts, her activities do not satisfy the third prong of
Howey.
Of equal importance, the seller's efforts also fail to satisfy
Howey because her behavior actually hinders profit-realization. After the pricing and actual sale of the assignment, the existence or
non-existence of the investor's profit will turn on the actual date of
the seller's death. The sooner the death, the greater the rate of

7.

Forman, 421 US at 852.
527 F2d 204 (10th Cir 1975).

71

Id at 211.

71
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return. Yet the seller is not attempting to die early, or even to die.
On an abstract level, the seller has no economic incentive to die
early. She has received a fixed price for the sale of her policy. She
will receive no more or no less regardless of how long she lives. The
counterargument that the value of the transfer to the seller decreases the longer she lives, because the same amount of assets
must be spread out over a longer period of time, is theoretically
correct but frivolous in terms of human behavior. There is no reason to believe that the seller does not share the almost universal
human trait of preferring life to death. In fact, her actions in participating in the settlement are testament to her preference for life.
The greatest value of viatical settlements to AIDS patients is that
they provide needed resources for medical expenses. If the seller
were interested in dying, she would forego medical treatment and
allow her estate or her named beneficiary to realize the proceeds of
the insurance policy, not an unrelated third party.
In non-brokered settlements, companies rely on no other person's efforts. Employing its own capital, the viatical settlement
company acquires and retains all ownership rights in the policies it
purchases, and eventually receives all of the life insurance proceeds. The only other party to the transaction is the seller. But the
seller's efforts have already been eliminated from the pool of possible third-prong efforts. As the company is left without an "other"
on whom to rely, non-brokered viatical settlements fail both the
literal and the liberal interpretations of Howey's third prong.
In brokered transactions, the broker's efforts fall Howey's
third prong because, like the seller's efforts, the broker's efforts are
not post-sale managerial or entrepreneurial. In a brokered viatical
settlement, the broker facilitates the transfer of ownership rights
from the policyholder to independent investors. The broker itself
never acquires or retains ownership rights. Instead, it simply
matches a willing investor with a seller. Within this role the broker
performs several important functions. The broker certifies the
seller's medical condition both by gathering medical affidavits and
records from the seller's physicians and by arranging for and reviewing an independent medical examination. Moreover, the broker prices the assignment of the seller's insurance policy. The potential investor is presented with a fixed purchase price predetermined by the broker. Whereas the price may or may not be
negotiable, the bulk of the calculations have been performed by
the broker, thereby relieving the buyer of the responsibility of acquiring and mastering the specialized medical, actuarial, and finan-
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cial information needed to assess a particular policy's market
value.
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These efforts all end before the actual event of assignment.
Once the life insurance policy has been assigned, the broker does
not contribute any entrepreneurial or managerial efforts. Expected
profits are not the product of the broker's active efforts. Like the
sale of a plot of land, the investor simply sits and waits, hoping
fortune will turn in her favor and she will receive the life insurance
proceeds soon enough to earn at least a market rate of return. Obviously, the broker cannot influence this outcome. In fact, after the
assignment is complete, the broker serves only the ministerial
function of filing a timely claim with the insurance company upon
the insured's death. As "ministerial" efforts do not satisfy either
interpretation of Howey's third prong,"5 brokered viatical settlements fal Howey's "solely from the efforts of others" requirement.
As stated earlier, an instrument must satisfy all elements of
Howey to be a security." Because both brokered and non-brokered
viatical settlements fail the third prong, Howey is not fulfilled. No
further analysis is needed to conclude that viatical settlements are
not securities. Nevertheless, an analysis of the fourth prong offers
further reasons to conclude that viatical settlements are not
securities.
2. Brokered viatical settlements under the fourth prong of
Howey.
Howey's fourth requirement-the "common enterprise" test
-complicates the analysis, not only because the circuit courts have
articulated three interpretations of the requirement, but also because the requirement makes little sense when applied to the facts
of viatical settlements. Nevertheless, the conclusion that necessarily follows from all interpretations is that viatical settlements do
not satisfy the "common enterprise" test. The definition of a common enterprise under Howey has created much controversy. In
Mordaunt v Incomco,7 7 the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve the dispute among the three competing interpretations of Howey's fourth prong, generally labelled "horizontal commonality," "broad vertical commonality," and "narrow vertical

" Telephone interview with Richard Bandfield (cited in note 59).
" See Koscot, 497 F2d at 485.
7e See text accompanying note 52.
7 469 US 1115 (1985).
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commonality. '7 8 Since the controversy remains unresolved, this
Comment will apply all three versions to viatical settlements.
Under horizontal commonality, a common enterprise is defined in terms of the relationship between individual investors. A
common enterprise exists if investor funds are pooled together,
usually with pro rata distribution of profits or losses.7 9 Both forms
of vertical commonality, on the other hand, define a common enterprise in terms of the relationship between the individual investor and the promoter. Narrow vertical commonality demands that
the success or failure of the investor mirror the success or failure of
the promoter; their fortunes must rise and fall together.8 0 The
broader form of vertical commonality requires only that the success or failure of the investor be dependent upon the efforts-rather than positively correlated with the profits-of the
promoter.8 1
Brokered viatical settlements fail Howey's fourth prong under
both narrow and broad vertical commonality. With regard to narrow commonality, because the broker earns a flat fee for services,
regardless of whether the investment turns a profit, the success of
the investor does not depend on the success of the promoter. The
fates of the investor and the promoter thus do not rise and fall
together; brokered settlements fail narrow commonality. Broad
" The Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have adopted horizontal commonality. The
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted broad vertical commonality. Only
the Ninth Circuit has adopted narrow vertical commonality. Comment, What is a Common
Enterprise?A Question of Legislative Intent, 11 Miss Coll L Rev 125, 127-28 (1990).
7 For endorsements of horizontal commonality, see Hirk v Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
561 F2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir 1977) (discretionary futures trading account not an investment
contract because of the absence of pooling); Curran v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, 622 F2d 216, 222 (6th Cir 1980) (same); Salcer v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, 682 F2d 459, 460 (3d Cir 1982) (same); Milnarik v M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F2d
274, 276 (7th Cir 1972) (same); Deckebach v La Vida Charters,Inc. of Florida,867 F2d 278,
281-83 (6th Cir 1989) (agreement between yacht purchasers and charter management firm
not a security because there was no pooling of capital); Wasnowic v Chicago Board of
Trade, 352 F Supp 1066, 1069 (M D Pa 1972) (discretionary commodity trading account not
a security absent pooling of funds); Poindexterv Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith,
684 F Supp 478, 481 (E D Mich 1988) (same).
8o For endorsements of this test, see Mordaunt v Incomco, 686 F2d 815, 817 (9th Cir
1982) (discretionary commodities trading account not a security because there was no direct
correlation between success of brokers and success of investment); Brodt v Bache & Co.,
Inc., 595 F2d 459, 461 (9th Cir 1978) (same); Hector,533 F2d at 433 (finding a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether "fortunes" were sufficiently "interwoven" among a farmer, a
feedlot, and a bank to constitute a common enterprise).
81 For an endorsement of this test, see SEC v ContinentalCommodities Corp., 497 F2d
516, 522 (5th Cir 1974), citing Koscot, 497 F2d 473 (finding that options on commodities
futures contracts were securities because the investors' success depended on the promoter's
expertise).
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commonality requires that the investor's success depend upon the
promoter's efforts. Yet, as established under the analysis of
Howey's third prong,"2 the promoter has contributed no efforts recognized by Howey. Howey considers only those managerial and entrepreneurial efforts contributed by the promoter after the investor
has committed her funds.8 3 Regardless of whether one identifies
the promoter as the broker or the policy seller, neither contributes
post-assignment efforts. As there are no promoter's efforts, the investor's success cannot depend on them. Brokered viatical settlements therefore satisfy neither narrow nor broad vertical
commonality.
Brokered viatical settlements also fail to satisfy Howey's
fourth prong under the horizontal commonality test. Horizontal
commonality refers to the pooling of resources by a number of investors to promote a joint enterprise and usually requires a pro
rata sharing of profits. 4 Obviously, when one investor purchases
all the ownership rights to a life insurance policy, there is no pooling. All the funds necessary for the investment came directly from
her.
Even when several investors combine to purchase a single life
insurance policy, the transaction lacks horizontal commonality.8 5
There is no pooling of funds in a joint enterprise from which the
investors receive a pro rata sharing of profits. Howey recognizes
the difference between the "nominal sale of property as a means of
pooling money to be used in a common. . . enterprise" and actual
asset sales.8 6 Only the former can fulfill the common enterprise requirement of Howey. In Howey, the Court realized that the sale of
orange grove acreage and servicing contracts constituted more than
"a fee simple interest in land .... The [companies] are offering an
opportunity to contribute money and share in the profits of a large
citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by respondents.
. . . The resulting transfer of rights in land is purely incidental. '8 7 Likewise, in Continental Marketing Corp. v SEC 88
81 See text accompanying notes 64-76.
83 McCown, 527 F2d 204.
4

Deckebach, 867 F2d at 283; Stenger v R.H. Love Galleries,Inc., 741 F2d 144 (7th Cir

1984).
85 Even in such multiple purchases, all of the ownership rights of a particular policy are
assigned at once. The assignment may be divided between several investors, but complete
transfer is effected in one step. The seller does not, for example, assign 20 percent of the
policy and then wait for the remaining 80 percent to be bought by other investors.
88 Stenger, 741 F2d at 147 (finding no horizontal commonality in the sale of twelve
paintings between the gallery owner and the purchaser).
87 Howey, 328 US at 299-300 (emphasis added).
88

387 F2d 466 (10th Cir 1967).
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and Kemmerer v Weaver,8 9 schemes involving beaver breeding
were held to be securities because "the economic inducement was
the faith or hope in the success of the enterprise-the domestic
beaver industry-as a whole, and not the value of the animals
alone." 90 Again the sale of live beavers was a proxy for an ownership interest in a larger enterprise. The nominal asset was sold and
the resulting monies were pooled to further the ongoing business
from which profits would be derived.
In multiple-purchaser brokered viatical settlements, the sale
of a fixed percentage interest of an insurance policy represents exactly what it purports to be. The buyer purchases an intangible
asset (the future right to a specific amount of money) and expects
to receive profits derived from the value of that asset-not from a
larger enterprise for which the asset is employed. The fact that
several investors purchase a fixed percentage of the same policy
does not convert individual asset sales into a common pool of invested funds. Each investor forwards her money to buy title to a
percentage of an insurance policy. The transfer of title of the insurance policy is the substance of the transaction. It is not incidental, and it is not a proxy for an ownership interest in a related
enterprise. There is no larger, related enterprise; hence, there is no
pooling. Brokered viatical settlements therefore do not satisfy a
horizontal commonality requirement.
In summary, brokered viatical settlements easily fulfill the
first two prongs of the Howey test but fail the third and fourth
prongs of Howey. Brokered viatical settlements are not securities
both because profits are not derived solely from the efforts of
others and because a common enterprise as defined by Howey does
not exist.
3. Non-brokered settlements under the fourth prong of
Howey.
Finally, non-brokered viatical settlements do not fulfill any of
the possible interpretations of Howey's fourth prong. First, there is
no horizontal commonality because the buyer purchases the ownership rights of insurance policies using her own capital and, as of
the date of this writing, holds the policies until maturity."1 Like
the case of the sole investor in a brokered settlement, only one per-

445 F2d 76 (7th Cir 1971).
Continental Marketing, 387 F2d at 471.
91 Telephone interview with Richard Bandfield (cited in note 59).
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son contributes capital. Whether the "person" is a natural person,
a partnership, or a corporation does not alter the conclusion that
there is no pooling of funds. Any intermingling of funds in a partnership or a corporation occurs at the stage of corporate or partnership formation, not when the entity purchases an asset like a
life insurance policy.
Nor is there vertical commonality between buyer and seller in
a non-brokered viatical settlement. Both the broad and narrow
vertical commonality tests rely on distinctions between investor
and promoter that make no sense in the context of a non-brokered
settlement. In non-brokered viatical settlements, the identity of
the promoter is unclear.
The purchaser cannot be the promoter because she is already
the investor. Both narrow and broad vertical commonality presume
the existence of two distinct, separate parties playing the roles of
promoter and investor. The tests ask what the relationship is between promoter and investor, not whether there is a separation of
identity between promoter and investor. The rationale for this rule
lies within the purpose of the '33 Act.
The federal securities laws protect investors from fraud.2 The
laws protect investors in part by requiring disclosure of information to the market. The bargaining imbalances of large-scale national or even regional securities markets render the individual one
of a multitude of fungible investors. Without the securities laws,
the individual cannot, in practice, force disclosure of the necessary
information as a condition of investing her money.93 The securities
laws mitigate this bargaining imbalance by mandating information
disclosure by issuing companies. Obviously, these concerns have no
application if the promoter and buyer are the same entity.
In non-brokered transactions, the only other candidate for
promoter is the seller, but the seller makes an awkward promoter
because the seller has little of the undisclosed information and

"2 Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 195 (1976) ("The Securities Act of
1933
. . . was designed. . . to protect investors against fraud.").
93 SEC v Ralston Purina Co., 346 US 119, 124 (1953) ("The design of the statute is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions."). See also James D. Gordon I, Common Enterprise and Multiple
Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 3 Colum
Bus L Rev 635, 659 (1988); Frank Easterbrook, Lecture at the University of Chicago Law
School (Jan 14, 1993). Similarly, the private offering exemption is limited by the idea that

the offerees must be "provided with or given access to the information that is material to
their investment decision." SEC v Murphy, 626 F2d 633, 643 (9th Cir 1980).
The buying company will need access to some (mainly medical) information concerning the seller, but the one-on-one bargaining process pressures the seller to reveal the infor-
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financial concerns typical of a promoter. With regard to information disclosure, the investor normally looks to the securities laws to
prompt the promoter to disclose financial records, past dealings,
and whatever other information she believes is relevant to her investment decision. Here, the only relevant information to disclose
is the existence of a particular life insurance policy, the solvency of
the insurance company, and the certification of the seller's medical
condition. Although this informatiofi demands verification for an
informed investment decision, the seller is no more equipped to
evaluate the financial state bf an insurance company than the SEC
is equipped to evaluate medical information. Requiring disclosure
by the seller-as-promoter could, in fact, frustrate the purposes of
the '33 Act by incorrectly signalling to investors that the disclosed
information has been approved by competent, qualified examiners,
thereby inducing unwarranted reliance by the investor.
With regard to the seller's financial concerns, the seller does
not expect to realize a profit through an ongoing enterprise or a
future investment. Instead, she wants to liquidate an asset to gain
funds for personal consumption. As such, her interest is limited to
(1) policing for what she might feel is an excessively discounted
offering price, and (2) attempting to negotiate for the highest possible sale price." She seeks the highest price on the final sale of an
asset, not profits from a future ongoing business or financial activity. As only the latter profit motive is applicable in the securities
context, e" the seller does not have a profit motive in any sense that
is relevant to a Howey determination. Her actions are simply an
assignment of a life insurance policy. The fact that other people
are employing the assignment as a speculative, profit-seeking investment does not alter or relate back to her actions. Because the
seller is not offering a security, she cannot be the promoter of a
security.
More importantly, there can be no promoter because there is
nothing to promote. As stated above, the seller is liquidating an
asset. She is not creating an ongoing venture and is not expecting
future profits from continued investment strategies or productive

mation. Since the buyer has the power to obtain necessary information when negotiating
with the seller, disclosure will occur independently of the securities laws.
95 It would be difficult for the seller to increase the value of her policy by misrepresenting the seriousness of her illness. Viatical settlement purchasers protect themselves from
fraud by requiring thorough, independent medical reviews and objective test criteria, such
as t-cell counts. See Bandfield, Viatical Settlements at 9 (cited in note 1).
96 Howey's "common enterprise" and profits "solely from the efforts of others" requirements indicate that the Act applies to investments in a future business or activity.
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enterprises. Likewise, the buyer is purchasing an asset. Her
purchase of an interest in an insurance policy (be it complete or
partial) is not a nominal title transfer facilitating investment in a
productive enterprise. There is no enterprise in which to invest.
There is only an asset to transfer, and all parties are engaged only
in asset-transferral. As there is no ongoing investment or enterprise to promote, there can be no promoter. Non-brokered viatical
settlements therefore fail to meet the requirement of either narrow
or broad vertical commonality under the fourth prong of the
Howey test.
To summarize, non-brokered viatical settlements fail the
Howey investment contract test. Because the settlement company
performs all necessary tasks on its own behalf, non-brokered settlements violate Howey's requirement that all profits derive "solely
from the efforts of others." Moreover, non-brokered settlements
fall under the vertical commonality version of the common enterprise requirement because of the commonality and exclusivity of
identity between investor and promoter. They also fail to satisfy
the specific requirements of a horizontal commonality test, because
only one investor purchases the policy.
C.

Functional Analysis of Viatical Settlements as Securities

Howey articulates the authoritative test for determining if unorthodox or innovative investments like viatical settlements are securities. Nonetheless, it is not the only or even the most relevant
means of analysis. When applying the test, courts must not lose
sight of their underlying purpose: To further the ends of the securities laws. Courts must determine which transactions fit within the
federal securities laws; when doing so they should not be "bound
by legal formalism, but instead [should] take account of the economics of the transaction under investigation. ' 97 Congress used the
"term 'investment contract' [as] a catch-all to bring within the securities acts interests that have the functional attributes of stock
and other formal securities but are not so denominated." 98 Therefore, this Comment supplements the Howey analysis with a functional analysis, probing directly what the Howey analysis probed
indirectly. Recognizing the value of direct inquiry, the Supreme
Court in Variable Annuity and United Benefit employed func-

Reves v Ernst & Young, 494 US 56, 61 (1990).
98 Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F2d
320, 324 (7th Cir 1983).
97
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tional analysis to determine if particular annuities fell within the
§ 3(a)(8) exemption of the '33 Act. 9 Applying the same functional
analysis to viatical settlements reaffirms this Comment's analysis
under Howey.
A functional analysis should begin with an understanding of
what differentiates a security from other profit-seeking investments. Why is a purchase of a share of stock a security whereas the
purchase of an empty plot of land with an eye towards the land's
future appreciation not a security? These cases might be distinguished by focusing on the purposes for which the invested funds
are sought.
The purpose which differentiates securities from other profitseeking investments is capital formation. "[T]he focus of the [securities] Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the
sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes."'100 Securities are unique among investments in that they participate in
the process of creating and nurturing entepreneurial activity. 10
Capital formation is active: building, supporting, and expanding
the market as it creates more potential capital through the profit
mechanism. 0 2 Other investment strategies, such as real estate investments or artwork, are passive: they add nothing to the productive process but derive their value from external events and signals. They sit inert-isolated and removed from the stream of
financial activity. They enter the stream only for title transfers or
similar formal transactions. As such, they are mechanisms for
wealth accumulation and transfer, but not for production or
growth.
The '33 Act therefore protects not only the individual investor
against fraud in the capital marketplace but it also protects the
integrity and functioning of the capital marketplace itself, by encouraging a steady, unhampered flow of funds into the market.
Thus, in the 1982 amendments to the '33 Act, Congress stated that
it acted to protect "capital formation in the form of investments in

9 See Section ll.B.
Forman, 421 US at 849.
101 Of course, capital can also be raised through mechanisms such as personal and family savings and through loans from financial or government institutions.
101 In Howey, the Court noted that, prior to the Act, state courts defined an "investment contract" as a "contract or scheme for the 'placing of capital or laying out of money in
a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment."' 328 US at 298, quoting
State v Gopher Tire and Rubber Co., 146 Minn 52, 56, 177 NW 937, 938 (1920) (emphasis
added).
100
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the U.S. securities markets." 10 3 These amendments advanced the
'33 Act's original objectives: "protecting public investors, assuring
market integrity, and, most important, restoring investor confidence in order to attract needed funds back into the U.S. capital
markets."'10 Given the '33 Act's goal of protecting capital formation and capital markets, the '33 Act's regulatory bounds logically
extend only to those profit-seeking investments that contribute to
capital formation.10 5
Viatical settlements do not contribute to capital formation. As
stated earlier, the investor transfers funds to the seller, who uses
them for personal consumption, not capital formation. Whereas
new capital is formed by a process of accretion, in which funds are
accumulated until they reach a productive mass, viatical settlements contribute to consumption, which actually dissipates the
transferred money. The transaction does not fund further productive financial activity. The cycle begins and ends with the transfer
to the policyholder.
This analysis reaffirms the determination reached under
Howey that viatical settlements are not securities. More importantly, it helps to explain the strains that became apparent in applying Howey to viatical settlements. Viatical settlements do not
fit neatly into the pre-defined categories of Howey because they do
not serve the same purpose as securities. Howey, though, never directly examines the purpose of the transaction. It instead focuses
on manifestations of the underlying security characteristics. Although viatical settlements share some of a security's features-investment of money, expectation of profits, at times forms
of vertical commonality-they do not function as tools of capital
formation. "[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within

103 Clarifying the Jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Definition of Security, HR Rep No 97-626(I), 97th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1982).
104 Id at 3 (emphasis added).
108 Courts read this emphasis on capital formation into the Act, limiting the "any note"
language in the definition of a security to investment, as opposed to commercial, paper.
Courts treat a note issued for investment purposes as a security, whereas a note issued for
commercial or consumer purposes is not considered a security. See Bellah v First National
Bank of Hereford, 495 F2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir 1974) (applying distinction between commercial paper and investment paper); Zabriskie v Lewis, 507 F2d 546, 551-52 (10th Cir 1974)
(holding that notes given "not for a consumer purpose but rather" to promote a corporation
were securities). Although ultimately the Supreme Court in Reves did not adopt the "investment versus commercial" purpose test, it did conclude that a note "exchanged to facilitate
...[a] commercial or consumer purpose" was less sensibly described as a security. 494 US
at 66.

The University of Chicago Law Review

the intention of its makers."106 Even if viatical settlements had superficially met the requirements of Howey, such superficial overlap
would not alter their fundamental nature and render them securities. "[F]orm should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." 11 In this instance, the Howey
test's goal of divining substance through form succeeds. However,
its strained and awkward application suggests that a more appropriate and insightful analysis is found through a functional
examination.108
CONCLUSION

Viatical settlements are not securities subject to the regulatory
control of the Securities Act of 1933. Although not eligible for exemption as § 3(a)(8) insurance products, they do not fall within
§ 2(1)'s definition of a security because they fail to satisfy all four
prongs of the Howey test. Moreover, substance must prevail over
form, and viatical settlements are similar in form, but not in substance, to securities. Viatical settlements play no role in capital
markets or capital formation. Therefore, they cannot be securities.
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Forman, 421 US at 849, quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v United States, 143

US 457, 459 (1892).
107 Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 US 332, 336 (1967); see also Reves, 494 US at 61 (when
determining which transactions fit within the coverage of the securities laws, federal courts
are "not bound by legal formalisms, but instead take account of the economics of the transaction under investigation"); Matek v Murat, 862 F2d 720, 724 (9th Cir 1988) (same).
108 Another factor which may in the future militate against securities regulation of viatical settlements is the existence of an alternate regulatory regime which sufficiently protects
investors' concerns. In MarineBank v Weaver, 455 US 551, 559 (1982), the Supreme Court
declined to find a certificate of deposit covered "under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected
under the federal banking laws." See also R.J. Wolf v Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739
F2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir 1984) (declining to find certificates of deposit for pesos to be securities due to the existence of American and Mexican bank regulatory structures). At present,
only a handful of states regulate the viatical settlement industry and, of those, only California requires licensing of viatical settlement companies. Dan Levy, Terminally Sick May
Cash in Life Insurance: California is First State to License "Living Benefits," San Fran
Chronicle Al (Apr 13, 1993). But if more states follow California's lead, federal securities
regulation may be unnecessary due to the existence of alternate consumer protection. Such
protection would, in fact, be preferable to securities regulation. Not only would it address
the specific concerns involved with viatical settlements, thereby eliminating the current incompatibility of securities regulation concerns with viatical settlements, but the regulations
would also address the concerns of viatical settlement sellers. California, for example, mandates the confidentiality of patient medical records, a concern not addressed in the securities laws.

